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Here is a train of thought that someone might have: 
Paris 
I’m going to go to Paris in two weeks. 
Flying with Ryanair is the cheapest way of getting to Paris. 
But Ryanair are greedy bastards who will rip you off if you close your eyes for a 
second. 
Flying with Aer Lingus is the cheapest and most convenient of the remaining 
options. 
To fly with Aer Lingus in two weeks, I must book now. 
So, I’ll book now. (Or action: straightaway, I book the flight) 
 
And here is another: 
 Advance 
The advance for the book has come in. 
It would be great to have a new guitar. 
On the other hand, the family needs a new car. 
I can’t get both a car and a guitar. 
Family comes first. 
So, I’ll buy a new car. 
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I believe both of these trains of thought could be manifestations of good (if possibly 
enthymematic) practical reasoning, the exercise of our capacity of reason pertaining to 
action. Not everyone would agree. Virtually everything about practical reasoning – among 
other things, its scope, premises, conclusions, and norms – is subject to widespread 
disagreement. In the face of such diversity, it seems to me that the best way to proceed is to 
stick close to everyday examples like Paris and Advance, and try to come to understand what 
if anything makes them instances of (good) practical reasoning. As the cases suggest, 
practical reasoning comes in many varieties. Paris begins with a proposition that is 
presumably the content of an intention to go to Paris, and concludes with an intention or 
action in service of that original intention. It thus is or contains an instance of instrumental 
reasoning. Advance, in contrast, begins with propositions that are contents of evaluations, 
broadly speaking, and concludes with a decision. I will stipulatively label non-instrumental 
practical reasoning deliberation. Much of what I say will concern instrumental reasoning, as 
it turns out to be difficult enough to make sense of its standards and psychology.  
My aim is not to survey the vast field as a whole. I will have to leave aside important 
questions, such as the role of decision theory in practical rationality. Instead, I will focus on 
two competing conceptions of practical reasoning that have emerged in recent philosophical 
literature. According to what I’ll call the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical 
reasoning aims at acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions so as to meet the 
synchronic requirements of rationality we ought to meet. John Broome, in particular, has 
recently developed an impressive account of reasoning as a rule-guided operation on 
contents of psychological states. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, in 
contrast, practical reasoning aims to get us to respond correctly to the reasons there are. For 
some in this tradition, rationality is an evaluative rather than normative notion, and reasoning 
is guided by our take on reasons rather than rules of rationality. Some Reasons-
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Responsiveness theorists believe standards of correctness for rational response derive, 
roughly, from what one would have objective reason to do, were things as one supposes.  
I’ll begin by examining the Rule-Guidance Conception, in particular the role, nature, 
and justification of the requirements of practical rationality that are central to it. As we’ll 
see, under pressure of criticism, emphasis has shifted from synchronic and symmetrical 
requirements to diachronic basing permissions that govern the process of reasoning when it 
goes well. This has brought the view closer to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception. But 
important differences remain. Reasons-Responsiveness theorists do not form a unified 
group, but I propose that a good way to make a number of arguments cohere is to say that 
requirements of rationality all derive from one’s subjective take on reasons, while the 
standard of good reasoning is given by how one ought to respond to things on the 
assumption that belief-inputs to reasoning are true and there is sufficient reason for non-
doxastic inputs such as intentions. On this view, we need to distinguish between three kinds 
of normative failure: irrationality, bad reasoning, and objectively mistaken conclusions. If 
this is right, merely distinguishing between rationality and reasons does not suffice to 
capture all the normative relations in play. 
In the final section, I argue that while Broome’s work offers important insight into 
the nature of reasoning as a conscious activity, the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception has 
an advantage when it comes to capturing the non-monotonic nature of practical reasoning, 
among other things. I also sketch an account of the process of instrumental reasoning, 
according to which there is no premise corresponding to the intention for the end. Instead, 
intention works in the background, motivating the reasoning and guaranteeing that the agent 
takes the fact that the means-action facilitates the end as a reason to take the means. 
  
1 Good Practical Reasoning: The Rule-Guidance Conception 
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To understand when a train of thought amounts to reasoning, we have to understand what 
makes reasoning correct or good, since even bad reasoning aspires to be good reasoning. 
The Rule-Guidance and Reasons-Responsiveness Conceptions offer radically different takes 
on what makes practical reasoning correct, and thus on the nature of practical reasoning in 
general. I will start with the former. Here are some theses that have been endorsed by its 
proponents: 
 Requirement Conformity 
 The point of reasoning is to come to conform to requirements of rationality. 
 
Wide-Scopism 
Requirements of rationality govern combinations of psychological states. 
 
Inference Basis 
 Requirements of rationality derive from inferential relations among contents. 
 
 Objective Normativity 
Rational requirements are objectively normative: one ought to (or has reason to) 
conform to them. 
 
Rule Guidance 
Reasoning is a process of revising thoughts that is guided by the rules of rationality. 
 
 
These theses are logically independent, so one might endorse Wide-Scopism without 
endorsing Inference Basis, for example. (In fact, the leading proponent of the view, John 
Broome, now rejects Inference Basis.) But they form a coherent picture.  
To see the appeal of this view, it is useful to consider the parallels between practical 
and theoretical reasoning. The two are closer than many used to think. To begin with, in 
much of older literature on the topic, it is claimed that the premises of practical reasoning are 
of the form “I want to…” or “I intend to…” and “I believe…”. For example, Georg Henrik 
von Wright says that in practical inference to necessary means “the premises are a person’s 
want and his state of knowing or believing a certain condition to be necessary for the 
fulfillment of that want.” (von Wright 1963, 168). His example of a first-person inference is 
the following: 
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I want to make the hut habitable.  
Unless I heat the hut, it will not become habitable.  
Therefore I must heat the hut. 
 
Engaging in the inference is meant to reveal a ‘practical necessity’ for the agent, and 
consequently motivate action.  
Alas, there are a number of problems with this pattern of inference. Most obviously, 
we can rationally want incompatible things, and surely are under no rational demand to take 
the means to each of them. (Quite the opposite.) Later writers in this Psychologistic tradition, 
such as Robert Audi, take the major premise to be of the form “I intend…” (Audi 2006). 
Intentions are a much more plausible candidate than desires for giving rise to rational 
demands, since their function is to enable intrapersonal and interpersonal coordination 
(Bratman 1987). But it is nevertheless problematic to psychologize the premises by 
including the agent’s intentions and beliefs in the content of the reasoning. 
 To see this, consider the parallel with theoretical reasoning. Suppose you know 
Shoshanna’s sense of humour, and are confident that she’ll laugh out loud if she watches 
Veep. She’s just about to watch it. So you reason that Shoshanna will laugh. How should we 
describe your reasoning? On the Psychologistic model, your thoughts would be the 
following: 
I believe Shoshanna will watch Veep. 
(Optional: I believe that) if Shoshanna watches Veep, she’ll laugh. 
So, Shoshanna will laugh. 
 
In terms of content, this is clearly an invalid argument (the premises could be true without 
the conclusion being true). Nor does the truth of the premises raise the probability of the 
conclusion without further assumptions. Consequently, it is plausibly a case of bad 
reasoning. Something has gone wrong. And it is evident what: this reconstruction fails to 
distinguish between your psychological state and its content. It is the latter that you reason 
with. The picture looks like this: 
	   6 
Psychological States Propositions 
Belief that Shoshanna will watch Veep Shoshanna will watch Veep 
Belief that if Shoshanna watches Veep, she 
will laugh 
If Shoshanna watches Veep, she will laugh 
Belief that Shoshanna will laugh Shoshanna will laugh 
 
Call the psychological states the premise-attitudes and the conclusion-attitude. In theoretical 
reasoning, they are beliefs with premises as their content. It is natural to think that what 
makes the transition from premise-beliefs to the conclusion-belief an instance of good 
deductive reasoning is that the contents of the premise-beliefs entail the content of the 
conclusion-belief. In inductive reasoning, the contents of premise-beliefs make the content 
of the conclusion-belief more probable. What theoretical rationality requires thus seems to 
derive from (likely) truth-preserving transitions from a set of believed propositions to 
another (Inference Basis). Further, what rationality requires seems to be that we either form 
the conclusion-belief or give up one of the premise-beliefs: it is the combination of having 
one but not the other that is guaranteed to be irrational (Wide-Scopism). Rule-Guidance 
theorists typically believe this rational requirement is normative in the sense that everyone 
objectively ought or at least has reason to conform to it (Objective Normativity). When we 
reason in the Shoshanna case, we lose or acquire beliefs in response to some modus ponens 
based rule (Rule Guidance) so as to come to conform to the wide-scope requirement 
(Requirement Conformity).  
On the Rule-Guidance Conception, practical reasoning consists in a psychological 
transition from premise-attitudes to the conclusion-attitude, where the latter is an intention. 
Take the last steps of the Paris case. They might be reconstructed as follows, assuming your 
name is Daniel: 
Psychological States Propositions 
Intention to fly in two weeks Daniel will fly in two weeks  
Belief that if I don’t buy a ticket now, I will 
not fly in two weeks 
If Daniel doesn’t buy a ticket now, Daniel 
will not fly in two weeks 
Intention to buy a ticket now Daniel will buy a ticket now 
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There are two obvious but possibly superficial differences from the theoretical case. First, 
propositions feature in practical reasoning in a first-personal mode of presentation (as on the 
left). This is plausibly a matter of character rather than content in Kaplan’s (1989) terms, so I 
will represent the contents in non-indexical terms (as on the right). Second, linguistic 
expressions of intention typically do not have propositional form – we do not ordinarily say 
“I intend that I will fly in two weeks”. But I’m going to grant here that intentions can be said 
to have propositional content.1 Broome (2004) takes it to be the same as the content of a 
belief about one’s future action. If p is the proposition that one φ-s, to intend to φ is (inter 
alia) to have a making-true attitude towards p, while to believe that p is to have a taking-true 
attitude towards p.  
In the instrumental case, then, it seems the premise-attitudes of practical reasoning 
are an intention and a belief about a possible action of one’s own that facilitates its 
realization, and the premises are the contents of those attitudes. What about the conclusion?2 
One popular view is that the conclusion is the proposition (in the first-personal mode of 
presentation) that is the content of the derived intention. The instrumental intention can then 
be called the conclusion-attitude of the reasoning. The basic argument for thinking this way 
is that forming an intention is as far as reasoning can get us (Broome 2000, 87). If reasoning 
tells me to press this key right now and I form the intention to do so, but I don’t press the 
key because of sudden paralysis, no amount of further reasoning will help. There is no 
mistake of reasoning involved. As Broome puts it, “[w]hat rationality requires of you is 
proper order in your mind” (2013, 152).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 However, see Dancy (2009) for several reasons to doubt this. 
2 A conclusion in the sense we’re asking about isn’t just anything that concludes the process of reasoning – a 
heart attack might do that. As Dancy (2014) emphasizes, we’re asking about the proper conclusion of practical 
reasoning, the thing that stands in the relevant normative relation to the premises. 
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There is, however, a venerable tradition going back to Aristotle that takes the 
conclusion of practical reasoning to be an action. After all, it is natural to think that practical 
reasoning concerns what to do, not what to intend (except in special cases). But even if we 
leave aside the issue about reach of reasoning, this view faces the challenge that actions do 
not, on the face of it, have propositional content. They are not propositional attitudes but 
events. As such, they cannot follow from the contents of any premise-attitudes.3 If Inference 
Basis or something analogous holds, this suffices to rule action out as conclusion.4 The third 
popular view, according to which practical reasoning concludes with a normative judgment, 
is compatible with what is said so far. The basic challenge to it is simple: why wouldn’t the 
process of forming an evaluative or normative belief be an instance of theoretical reasoning? 
For cognitivists about normative judgment, such beliefs concern putative facts, for which we 
have more or less evidence. We engage in standard belief reasoning and conclude that we 
ought to or have conclusive reason to do such and such, but there is nothing distinctive about 
the requirements of rationality governing this process. Once we have such a judgment, 
however, many think we can reason from it to intention or action. In such practical 
reasoning, however, the judgment functions as a premise-attitude rather than as the 
conclusion. And there is little reason to think that practical reasoning necessarily involves 
such premises.5 
Let us assume, for now, that practical reasoning proceeds from the contents of 
premise-attitudes and concludes with an intention. The Rule-Guidance Conception says it is 
a conscious activity that aims at conforming to requirements of practical rationality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This argument goes back to Hume, who argued that since reason is concerned with truth and falsehood and 
actions cannot be either true or false, they cannot be ”either contrary to or conformable to reason” (Treatise 
3.1.1, 458). Maria Alvarez (2010) defends the view that actions do have content, which is the same as the 
content of the intention with which one acts. For problems with such proposals, see Dancy 2009. 
4 For other arguments against the Aristotelian view and responses to them, see Tenenbaum 2007. 
5 Dancy (2014) also observes that it is often the very same things that favour thinking that one ought to do 
something that favour doing it. He is surely right that favouring action is more basic – the facts favour 
believing that you ought to do something because they favour your doing it. 
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(Requirement Conformity). I will discuss the Rule Guidance conception of the nature of this 
activity in Section 3, and will briefly examine Objective Normativity in the next section. But 
in order to understand and assess these claims, we’ll first have to have an idea of what the 
requirements of practical rationality might be and why we should think they are such. Here 
are versions of two commonly suggested schemas: 
Wide Means-Ends Concordance (WME) 
Rationality requires of you that [if you intend to E at t and believe that you will not E 
at t unless you M at t, and that you will not M at t unless you intend to M at t, you 
intend to M at t]. 
 
The Wide Enkratic Principle (WEP) 
Rationality requires of you that [if you believe that you ought to φ, and that you will 
φ if you intend to φ and will not φ unless you intend to φ, you intend to φ]. 
 
Let us begin with the content of these requirements. For them to have wide scope means that 
rationality requires one not to have a certain combination of states. Suppose you intend to 
get your uncle’s money and believe that you will not get it unless you kill him, and believe 
(most likely implicitly) that you won’t kill your uncle unless you intend to kill your uncle, 
yet lack the intention to kill your uncle. You are in violation of WME. Since (by Objective 
Normativity) rationality is normative, you have reason to either intend to kill your uncle or 
give up your intention to get his money or give up one of your beliefs. Note in particular that 
it doesn’t follow from your having the end-intention and the means-beliefs that you have 
reason to (intend to) kill your uncle. That would only follow if the rational requirement had a 
narrow scope – that is, if you would be required to have the means-intention whenever you 
have the end-intention and the means-beliefs. The core argument for Wide-Scopism is 
precisely that narrow-scope requirements would result in illegitimate bootstrapping: we 
could create reasons or oughts to do silly or evil things simply by having goals for which we 
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took them to be necessary.6 Similarly, a narrow scope version of the Enkratic Principle 
together with Objective Normativity entails that whenever I believe I ought to do something, 
I am rationally required and thus ought to or have reason to do it. But I am not infallible 
about what I ought to do. Wide-Scopism (seemingly) avoids bootstrapping and infallibility.  
 Why would rationality require us to have or avoid certain combinations of intentions 
and beliefs? There are many ways to argue for this. Inference Basis says that the 
requirements derive from inferential relations among the contents of intentions and beliefs. 
Here, I will only briefly discuss a tempting thought along these lines. The thought is this: 
Suppose you believe that if you won’t kill your uncle, you won’t get his money. Then it 
seems that simply in virtue of inferential relations among propositions, you can’t rationally 
believe that you’ll get your uncle’s money without believing that you’ll kill him. As you see 
it, getting his money entails killing him. Consequently, it seems you can’t rationally set out 
to make true that you’ll get your uncle’s money without setting out to make true that you’ll 
kill him. So the requirement to [intend the necessary means if you intend the end] seems to 
derive from inferential relations among propositions. (I’m leaving out a lot of potentially 
quite problematic assumptions here.7) Alas, even if there were no problems with auxiliary 
assumptions in this argument, there is a gap between logical validity and what appear to be 
correct instances of practical reasoning. Most obviously, it is common and apparently correct 
to reason to best means, even if the best means isn’t necessary. Maybe I think I could get my 
uncle’s money by slaving for him until he dies, but just think killing him would be a better 
way to do it. However, if killing my uncle is just a way (even if it is the best one) of getting 
my uncle’s money, then even if I will get his money, it doesn’t follow that I will kill him. So 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Broome offers another reason why bootstrapping is problematic by drawing a parallel with the theoretical 
case. Suppose it was a narrow scope requirement of theoretical rationality that if you believe that p and that p-> 
q, you ought to believe that q. Now, every proposition trivially follows from itself (p -> p). So if you believe 
that p, then by the narrow scope requirement, you ought to believe that p! In other words, whatever you 
believe, you ought or have reason to believe. Such bootstrapping is evidently objectionable. 
7 For developments of this type of argument, see Harman (1976), Wallace (2001), Broome (2004), Audi 
(2006), and Setiya (2007). For problems, see Brunero (2009) and (2014) and Broome (2013). 
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without making a logical mistake, I could set out to make true that I’ll get his money without 
setting out to make true that I kill him. Thus, inferential relations among contents can’t 
explain why reasoning to best or sufficient means isn’t always bad reasoning. Going beyond 
instrumental reasoning presents even more daunting challenges. So Inferential Basis seems 
false. (Broome, for example, now rejects it.) Insofar as the correctness of theoretical 
reasoning drives from inferential relations among contents, there will thus be a major 
difference between theoretical and practical reasoning. 
 How about Wide-Scopism? It doesn’t fall with Inference Basis, since wide-scope 
requirements could be defended on other grounds, such as appeal to intuitions about 
rationality. But it has been directly challenged on the basis of the synchronic and 
symmetrical nature of wide-scope requirements. Simplifying a little, you can come to satisfy 
WME either by intending the means or giving up the end, and WEP either by forming the 
intention or giving up the belief. Suppose you find yourself not intending to do what you 
believe you ought to. Which way should you go? WEP gives you no guidance. This is 
problematic in two different ways. First, Niko Kolodny argues that principles that don’t 
guide us by telling us what to do to comply with them cannot be normative (2005, 517; 
2007). At best, they provide a standard for evaluating the state we’re in, like the 
‘requirements’ of beauty. Normative principles of rationality have to be diachronic: to tell us 
what to do going forward from where we are now.  
The second, related issue with Wide-Scopism is that it seems that in many cases, the 
different ways of coming to satisfy a wide-scope requirement are not in fact equally rational 
(Schroeder 2004). Suppose you believe you have conclusive reason to stop eating chocolate 
but don’t intend to stop eating chocolate. There is a conflict among your attitudes that you 
can rationally resolve by forming the intention to stop eating chocolate. But you cannot 
rationally resolve it by giving up your belief that you have conclusive reason to stop eating 
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chocolate on the basis of lacking the intention. After all, a different principle of rationality 
tells you to base your beliefs on your evidence, and that hasn’t changed. Here a Wide-Scoper 
might say, to be sure, that changing the belief is only epistemically irrational, but as far as 
practical rationality goes, either way of coming to meet WEP is on a par. The rejoinder is 
that if you change your ought belief to match your intention, your problem is not merely 
epistemic (Schroeder 2004, 346). 
 Broome has responded to these criticisms by introducing his own version of 
diachronic and asymmetric requirements, or rather permissions. On his current view, a move 
in reasoning is correct if it is allowed by a rational basing permission interacting with a 
requirement of rationality. The form of such permissions is the following: 
 Rationality permits N that 
 N has attitude A at some time and 
 N has attitude B at some time and 
 N has attitude C at some time and 
 … 
 N has attitude K at some time and 
 N’s attitude K is based on N’s attitudes A, B, and C. (Broome 2013, 190) 
 
For an attitude to be based on another attitude is, roughly, for it to be caused by the other 
attitude in a way that is sensitive to the content of the attitude. Leaving aside questions about 
the precise nature of this relation, appealing to it allows Broome to say that basing your 
belief that you ought not φ on your not intending to φ is rationally prohibited, while, 
roughly, basing your intention on your ought-belief is rationally permitted. While he admits 
there is no general method for deriving basing permissions from synchronic requirements, he 
believes the two are closely related (2013, 248). After all, on the Rule-Guidance Conception, 
the point of reasoning, which is directly governed by basing permissions and prohibitions, is 
to come to meet synchronic requirements. I will return to how this might happen in Section 
3, having examined the alternative view of correct reasoning in the next section. 
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2 Good Practical Reasoning: The Reasons-Responsiveness Conception 
Reasons-responsiveness theorists of rationality and reasoning endorse the contemporary 
consensus view that reasons are facts or states of affairs or possibly true propositions that 
count in favour of action and attitudes like belief, desire or intention. This conception of 
reasons is compatible with many different explanations of what it is for R to favour φ-ing 
and what makes it the case that R favours φ-ing. Most agree that it is possible for R to be a 
reason for some S to φ even if S doesn’t know R or see that R favours φ-ing – for example, I 
may have a reason to give to charity even if I don’t think so. It is plausible that what we 
(objectively) ought to do is what we have conclusive reason to do. If we recognize and 
respond to all our reasons correctly, we will thus act (and believe) as we should. 
 Yet almost everyone agrees that there are dimensions of normativity beyond doing 
the right thing. We can be rational or engage in good reasoning while nevertheless ending up 
doing what we shouldn’t or not doing what we should. Suppose there is an elaborate trail of 
planted evidence that leads me to blamelessly but falsely believe that my neighbour has 
killed his wife (see Gone Girl), and will escape without punishment unless I shoot him in the 
hand. Because of this, I shoot an innocent man in the hand. I ought not do so, in the sense 
that there is conclusive objective reason for me not to harm an innocent person.8 Yet it could 
be rational for me to think otherwise, and I might be able to form the intention to shoot by 
correct reasoning from justified assumptions. Indeed, as Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way 
(forthcoming) emphasize, the starting points of good reasoning can be even worse: if you 
irrationally believe the your plane will crash, you can reason well to a decision not to board 
it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The issue is complicated, however, since at least in some cases, it appears that what I ought to do hangs on 
my epistemic situation. Some argue that this means we should distinguish between subjective and objective 
oughts, while others hold that either evidence-relative or evidence-independent oughts are merely apparent. For 
discussion, see the Sepielli chapter and Kiesewetter 2013. 
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How, then, could we hope to make sense of rationality or good reasoning in terms of 
responsiveness to reasons? I will here focus on two kinds of answer, which I’ll stipulatively 
label Subjectivism and Subjunctivism.9 Roughly, Subjectivism says that we are rational 
when we have the attitudes we take ourselves to have sufficient reason (of the right kind) to 
have, and reason well when transitions from one set of attitudes to another are governed by 
our take on reasons. The paradigm of irrationality is thinking that I have most reason to 
believe or intend X and failing to do so. In the shooting case, my evidence might support the 
belief I ought to shoot, and it might make it rational for me to form the intention to shoot. 
Subjunctivism, in turn, says that what rationality requires is having attitudes one has 
conclusive reason to have if one’s beliefs are true (or: having attitudes one would have 
conclusive reason to have, were one’s beliefs true10). In the shooting case, perhaps it is true 
that were there no other way to prevent my neighbour from escaping punishment for murder, 
I ought to shoot him in the hand because of this. In that case, it seems that I’ve responded to 
the misleading evidence the way I should when I form the intention to shoot based on it. If 
I’ve reasoned from the supposed facts to acting the way I did, I’ve reasoned well.  
Reasons-responsiveness theorists, among whom I include Maria Alvarez, Jonathan 
Dancy, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Niko Kolodny, Errol Lord, Joseph Raz, Thomas Scanlon, and 
Mark Schroeder, form a fairly heterogeneous group. Here are some theses that can be 
gleaned from their work, though none would endorse all of them: 
Reason Conformity 
The point of reasoning is to come to conform to objective reasons in one’s thought 
and action as well as one can.  
 
Subjectivism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For other views I lack the space to discuss here, see Kiesewetter 2013, Lord 2014, and Sylvan 2015.  
10 Strictly speaking, the counterfactual construal invites the conditional fallacy – the closest possibility in which 
I have true beliefs might be one in which I ought not do what I actually ought to do. That’s why it’s better to 
say, as Schroeder (2009) does, that one has what I’m calling a subjunctive reason if one has beliefs such that if 
they are true, one has objective reason. I’ll nevertheless use subjunctive formulations for convenience. 
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Subjective reasons are considerations one takes to be or treats as objective reasons. 
Rationality requires believing or intending what one takes oneself to have conclusive 
reason for. 
 
Subjunctivism 
Subjunctive or would-be reasons to F are propositions one believes which, if true, are 
objective reasons to F. Rationality requires believing or intending what one has 
conclusive subjunctive reason for. 
 
Error Theory About Structural Rationality 
There are no structural requirements of rationality; the appearance is merely the 
consequence of how subjective or subjunctive reasons for attitudes predictably stack 
up. 
 
Subjective Normativity 
Doing or believing as rationality requires is normative only from the agent’s first-
personal perspective. 
 
Value Thesis 
It is not necessarily the case that we ought to do what we have conclusive subjective 
or subjunctive reason to do, but acting on subjective or subjunctive reasons is 
nevertheless a good disposition or virtue.  
 
 
In the rest of this section, I will examine the competing theses of Subjectivism and 
Subjunctivism in more detail, discussing the other theses as they come up. The next section 
will consider implications for the nature of practical reasoning.  
 Subjectivism, as I have defined it, claims rationality is to be understood in terms of 
subjective reasons, which represent our take on objective reasons. Here are its core claims, a 
little more precisely stated (based on Kolodny 2005, 524 and Kolodny 2008, 457): 
Core+  
If one believes at t that one has conclusive reason to have attitude A, then one is 
rationally required to form or sustain, going forward from t, on the basis of this 
belief, A. 
 
Core-  
If one believes at t that one has conclusive reason not to have A, then one is 
rationally required to revise or refrain from forming, on the basis of this belief, going 
forward from t, A. 
 
(These principles should be read with the proviso that things don’t change in relevant 
respects in the course of reasoning.) The rationale for these principles is simply that, as 
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Thomas Scanlon puts it, “it seems clearly irrational to fail to have an attitude one explicitly 
judges oneself to have conclusive reasons for” (2007, 90) Note that I have formulated the 
principles so that not only do rational requirements have narrow scope, but they are also 
diachronic: they tell you to form an attitude on the basis of your beliefs. Such requirements 
do not set a state as a target for the process of reasoning, but rather directly govern the 
process of reasoning. They thus play a role similar to Broome’s basing permissions. If all 
rational requirements have this form, it follows that it is not necessarily irrational to have 
inconsistent intentions or beliefs, for example. If you are hit in the head and acquire the 
belief that the Earth is flat without giving up your existing belief it’s not, you do not thereby 
become irrational. Instead, as Kolodny puts it, “Being rational just is responding in the ways 
that process-requirements call for.” (2005, 517) Rational requirements govern the way we 
conduct our thinking in the light of our evidence and commitments (assuming that having 
evidence or a commitment entails judging oneself to have reason to believe or intend). 
The Subjectivist idea is that other rational requirements can be derived from the Core 
ones. For example, it is a short step from Core+ to the following:  
Narrow Enkratic Principle (NEP) 
If you believe that you have conclusive reason to φ, and that you will φ if you intend 
to φ, and will not φ unless you intend to φ, rationality requires of you that you intend 
to φ. 
 
The most obvious objection is that this allows bootstrapping – by NEP, if I falsely believe I 
have conclusive reason to poison the water supply, rationality requires me to intend to do so 
on the basis of the belief.11 But surely I have no reason to do so! Avoiding this was the key 
motivation for Wide-Scopism. Subjectivism avoids bootstrapping reasons or oughts into 
existence in another way: by denying that rationality provides reasons, and endorsing 
Subjective Normativity instead. On this view, rationality is only seemingly normative, since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 More precisely: intending is rational, as long as I have the belief. If my evidence doesn’t support the belief, 
theoretical rationality requires changing it. 
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whenever a rational requirement applies to someone, it will seem to her that she ought to do 
what it tells her to do. (Kolodny (2005) labels this the Transparency Account.) For example, 
NEP only applies to you if you believe you have conclusive reason to poison the water 
supply and that poisoning it depends on your intending to do so, and it tells you to intend to 
poison. In any such situation, it will seem to you that you ought to intend to poison the water 
supply. From your perspective, it is as if the rationally required thing is the thing to do.  
Note that the fact that rationality requires you to intend something doesn’t itself 
provide either a subjective or an objective reason for anything. The subjective reason to 
intend is whatever you take to be the conclusive reason to poison the water supply, 
combined with the action’s being up to you. So rationality itself isn’t normative in any way. 
It is, after all, surprisingly difficult to say what is the reason to be rational such that we ought 
to satisfy rational requirements in every case, even when doing so results in our doing or 
believing something we should not, as it certainly might.12 This is why subjectivist Reasons-
Responsiveness theorists reject Objective Normativity. But rationality may still be an 
evaluative notion, as the Value Thesis says. There’s something to be said for you as an agent 
in virtue of satisfying rational requirements. It follows, importantly, that rational process 
requirements themselves cannot guide reasoning, since they are not normative. Subjective 
reasons can, since they appear to you to be normative, and when they do guide your 
reasoning, you are rational. 
There are two other main challenges to Subjectivism. The first is attitude scarcity. 
Broome notes that we rarely have explicit thoughts about what we have sufficient reason (of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Kolodny 2005, Raz 2005, Broome 2007, and Bratman 2009 for discussion. Jonathan Way (2010) 
provides an ingenious answer to the problem in the case of instrumental rationality. Briefly, he argues that the 
fact that M is necessary for E is a reason to either give up the intention to E or to intend to M. Assuming that 
rationality requires us to do what we would have reason to do, were things as we suppose, if you believe that M 
is necessary for E, rationality requires you either to give up the intention to E or to intend to M. This is a 
Subjunctivist move, and Way’s view does, in my view, ultimately belong to the Reasons-Responsiveness 
camp. If he’s right, there are wide-scope requirements that derive from subjunctive reasons and have 
jurisdiction over only some individuals, which makes them very different from the kind of wide-scope 
requirements central to the Rule-Guidance Conception. 
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the right kind13) to intend or believe, so even if such thoughts suffice to rationalize intending, 
appeal to subjective reasons won’t account for why rationality always requires intending as 
we believe we ought, for example (2013, 97–98). The obvious move in response to this is to 
appeal to implicit reasons thoughts, which might not be equally scarce. I will briefly return 
to this below when discussing reasoning. 
The second objection is getting the extension of rational requirements wrong: it 
seems we are sometimes rationally required to believe or intend in certain ways even if we 
don’t think we have reason to do so, and are sometimes not rationally required to believe or 
intend in certain ways even if we do think we have reason to do so. Take means-end 
coherence. I intend to get my uncle’s money and believe I have to kill him to get it – no 
beliefs about reasons for attitudes are evident, so why would rationality require intending to 
kill, according to Subjectivism? Scanlon provides material for an interesting response based 
on a thesis about the nature of intention: “[A] person who believes that doing A would 
advance some end of hers will … see the fact that A would advance this end as a reason for 
doing A simply because she has the end in question” (2007, 86).14 So: one of the things that 
makes my attitude concerning getting my uncle’s money an intention is that I do take the 
fact (as I believe) that killing my uncle would facilitate getting his money as a reason to kill 
him, and the fact (as I believe) that intending to kill my uncle is a condition of my killing 
him as a reason to intend to kill him. So whenever I have the end-intention and the means-
beliefs, I will have (conclusive) subjective reason to intend to take the believed means. That 
is part of what it is to be committed to the end.15 It doesn’t yet follow that I am irrational all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For reasons of space, I leave aside the issue of reasons for intending that are not reasons for acting. For my 
take, see Kauppinen (2014).  
14 I have elided, among other things, Scanlon’s qualification “insofar as she is rational”. I don’t think it can be 
made sense of in this context, if all rational requirements are to derive from Core+ and Core-. (See next 
footnote.) 
15 On this point, Scanlon seems to be treating commitment as a distinct normative primitive. On his view, it’s 
irrational to fail to treat M’s facilitating E as a reason to M, because that would “involve acting contrary to a 
commitment that one has made (and not revised)” (2007, 93). On my variant, again, being committed to E is, 
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things considered if I don’t so intend, since I might take myself to have more reason not to 
kill. In that case, rationality would require giving up the end-intention instead. But that is 
just how it should be – it isn’t all things considered irrational to fail to take the means to 
one’s end, if one takes the cost of the means to exceed the benefit of the end. (In that case, it 
is all things considered irrational not to give up the end.) 
This quick Subjectivist account of means-end coherence will certainly not quell all 
the doubts. Part of the case will be providing an error theory about Wide-Scopism. Such a 
theory claims that whenever there seems to be a wide-scope requirement prohibiting a 
combination of attitudes, there is in fact subjective (or subjunctive) reason to drop one of the 
conflicting attitudes. (See the Way chapter for discussion.) Even if that is accepted, however, 
Subjectivism has some counterintuitive consequences. As Parfit (2011, 120–121) famously 
notes, according to Subjectivism, if you believe you have no reason to avoid agony on 
Tuesdays (or don’t believe you have such a reason), it is not rationally required of you that 
you choose a painless operation on Wednesday rather than an excruciatingly painful one on 
Tuesday. Yet surely someone who doesn’t choose the painless operation is irrational, or so 
the thought goes. Rationality appears to have some sort of substantive aspect that transcends 
our opinions concerning reasons.  
My suggestion is that at least some of this pressure goes away if we distinguish 
between rationality and reasoning well in addition to distinguishing between rationality and 
what we objectively ought to do. The rationale for this distinction is that there are (at least) 
three different kinds of normative failure in this vicinity. First, I will be objectively mistaken 
if I fail to act or think the way I have conclusive objective reason to act or think, regardless 
of my beliefs and commitments. Second, there is something wrong with me if I don’t act or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
among other things, treating M’s facilitating E as a reason to M, so that what is irrational is failing to M (unless 
the subjective reason is outweighed). On my version, the only irrationality in acting contrary to the 
commitment is acting against one’s take on reasons. It is thus compatible with Core+ and Core- being the 
source of all rational requirements. 
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believe as I take myself to have conclusive reason to act or believe, regardless of what 
reasons there objectively are for me. This is what I propose to call irrationality in the narrow 
sense.16 But there is a further way in which I can go wrong that is not captured by either of 
these categories. Suppose again that I believe an operation on Tuesday would cause agony, 
while a Wednesday one would be only inconvenient. It is very plausible that if this belief is 
true, I have conclusive reason not to have the operation on Tuesday. But it’s possible that I 
somehow fail to recognize the badness of pain on Tuesday, and instead reason from An 
operation on Tuesday would be painful but convenient to I will have the operation on 
Tuesday. Further, if it happens to be the case that my belief is false, and that the Tuesday 
operation is both painless and convenient, I’m not objectively mistaken in forming the 
intention either – the reasons there are for me to favor choosing the Tuesday operation. 
Nevertheless, had things been as I took them to be, I would have made a terrible mistake 
(call this the Tuesday Case). So it seems clear that there is something wrong with my 
thinking on this matter. My suggestion is that it is natural to describe this as an instance of 
bad reasoning. My misguided normative belief led me to reason to the wrong conclusion 
from a true non-normative belief. Good reasoning requires some kind of sensitivity to the 
reasons there are if things are as we suppose them to be, not just forming attitudes 
conforming to our take on reasons. After all, when we reason badly, it’s typically precisely 
because we mistakenly treat something as a reason when it’s not, or treat something as a 
weightier reason than it actually is. 
The last kind of failure is the starting point of what I’m calling Subjunctivist theories. 
However, they are standardly formulated as theories of rationality (or subjective ought), and 
thus presented as competition to Subjectivism. Here is how Derek Parfit formulates the 
view: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Although in work in progress, I develop Kurt Sylvan’s (2015) idea that rationality’s demands are determined 
by a competent take on reasons, where competence is fallible sensitivity to objective reasons. 
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We are rational insofar as we respond well to reasons or apparent reasons. We have 
some apparent reason when we have beliefs about the relevant facts whose truth 
would give us that reason. (Parfit 2011, 5) 
 
I think it is misleading to talk about apparent reasons in this way. Suppose I believe there is 
gin and tonic in the glass. If these beliefs were true, I might have reason to drink from the 
glass. This is the case even if the glass actually contains petrol (call this the Gin Case). But I 
don’t necessarily take myself to have reason to drink gin and tonic – the supposed fact need 
not appear as a reason to me even if it is one, relative to my beliefs. So it is misleading to 
say I have an apparent reason to drink in the circumstances. For the same reason, 
Schroeder’s term subjective reason (2009, 233) is also somewhat misleading. So I prefer my 
own subjunctive reason, or Kurt Sylvan’s (2015) would-be reason. I also disagree with Parfit 
about rationality being connected to subjunctive reasons, as long as the beliefs in question 
concern non-normative facts. There may be nothing irrational about believing that the glass 
contains gin and tonic and not drinking from it, even if that fact is in context a conclusive 
reason to drink, as long as one does not take the fact that there is gin and tonic to provide a 
reason. In addition, we need some label for the failure involved in forming attitudes or acting 
against our own take on reasons. It might be worth reserving the term “irrationality” for this. 
However, even if Subjunctivism is problematic as an account of rationality, it might 
offer a standard for good reasoning. Reasoning involves drawing a conclusion on the basis 
of (the contents of) premise-attitudes. The contents of at least some of the premise-attitudes 
may be such that were they to obtain, they would sufficiently favour the conclusion. (As 
Dancy (2014) observes, if we think in these terms, the conclusion favoured by the reasons 
may after all be an action rather than just intention.) Here is a suggestion in the Subjunctivist 
spirit:  
Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons  
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Reasoning from the contents of premise-attitudes to conclusion C is good if and only 
if, and because, if non-normative facts are as the agent assumes, the contents of 
belief-premises are sufficient reasons for C.17 
 
This accounts straightforwardly for deductive and (good) inductive reasoning, since if the 
premises of such reasoning are true, they necessitate the truth of the conclusion-belief or 
make it probable, and thus are sufficient reasons for it, assuming that the right kind of 
reasons for believing have to do with truth. It also certifies the agent’s reasoning in the Gin 
Case, since had the agent’s belief been true, she would (we’re assuming) have had sufficient 
reason to drink. Also, reasoning in Tuesday Case turns out to be bad by this standard, since 
had the non-normative facts been as the agent took them to be, she wouldn’t have had 
sufficient reason to choose the painful operation. How about defeasible reasoning? McHugh 
and Way (forthcoming) point out that in the absence of defeaters, it can be good reasoning to 
infer from Somebody said that p to p. But surely, one might protest, the mere fact that 
someone said that p isn’t sufficient reason to believe that p! True – it is easily defeasible. 
That’s why the principle says “if non-normative facts are as the agent assumes”, not just if 
the agent’s premise-beliefs are true. If the agent additionally believes that the speaker is a 
liar, then if non-normative facts are as the agent assumes, the fact that the speaker said that p 
is not a sufficient reason to believe that p, and the reasoning is not good. But if the agent has 
no such additional beliefs about defeaters, their reasoning is okay. This is arguably the case 
even if the agent should, in the light of their evidence, realize that the speaker is lying. When 
we assess the quality of a piece of reasoning, we focus on local rather than global features of 
an agent’s thinking. Even if you’ve reasoned badly to p, or adopted p on non-rational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Here is how Dancy puts it in the context of discussing someone who begins from false premises: ”What they 
deliberate from is not the case, but they may still be correctly tracking what that situation would have favoured 
had it been the case, and deciding to act accordingly. In such a case, they will have reasoned well, but since 
they started in the wrong place they may well end up doing the wrong thing, or a wrong thing anyway.” (Dancy 
2014, 6). 
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grounds, you can still reason well from p to q, if the truth of p would give sufficient reason 
to believe that p in the context of your other assumptions. 
 Yet things are not so rosy for Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons when it comes 
to practical reasoning. Suppose you intend to get your uncle’s money. In the best kind of 
case for this view, you also have (false) non-normative beliefs about your family affairs such 
that were they true, you ought to get your uncle’s money. Next assume that you believe that 
killing your uncle is necessary and sufficient for getting his money. If both these beliefs are 
true, you plausibly have sufficient reason to kill your uncle. Why? Following Raz’s (2005) 
insightful discussion, many have endorsed the following kind of principle: 
Transmission 
If you have a reason to E and doing M would non-superfluously facilitate E, you 
have a reason to M, of a strength proportionate to the strength of the reason to E and 
the probability of E-ing given M. 
 
(For more precise formulation and argument, see Kolodny’s chapter.) Roughly, transmission 
explains how your reason to get your uncle’s money generates a reason to kill your uncle, if 
your beliefs are true. Hence, by Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons, reasoning from your 
end-beliefs and means-beliefs to intending to kill your uncle is good reasoning – it mirrors 
the structure of objective reasons if things are the way you think (call this the Uncle Case). 
 But hold on! The content of the intention wasn’t mentioned in the story, and means-
ends coherence surely has to do with means to an end one has! It is indeed hard to find a 
place for intention in Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons, since intending doesn’t seem 
to amount to supposing that things are in a certain way. The basic move is to say that 
intending ensures the presence of certain beliefs. For example, Mark Schroeder suggests the 
following hypothesis about the nature of intention: “If you intend to do A, then you have 
some beliefs which are such that, if they are true, then you objectively ought to do A.” 
(2009, 236; see the consequent discussion for modifications). But this is a highly dubious 
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assumption. We can, after all, have intentions for which we don’t even think there is 
sufficient reason, as when we akratically intend to take another piece of chocolate. 
 What if the restriction to non-normative facts were removed from Tracking Sufficient 
Would-Be Reasons? The thesis would then be that what makes reasoning good is that were 
both the agent’s normative and non-normative beliefs true, she would have sufficient reason 
for the conclusion. This would help to explain the goodness of instrumental reasoning if 
intending involves believing that one has sufficient reason for the end, or at least the means. 
(These assumptions would require a lot of defence, of course.) It would also explain why it’s 
good reasoning to move from I ought to jump off the train to I shall jump off the train even if 
one doesn’t actually have sufficient reason to jump off the train (Train Jump Case). Alas, it 
would also certify the bad reasoning in the Tuesday Case – after all, were the agent’s false 
normative belief that pain on future Tuesdays doesn’t matter true, she would have sufficient 
reason to choose the Tuesday operation. While it makes sense to bracket the truth of the 
agent’s non-normative beliefs in assessing the quality of the transition from premises to 
conclusion, it doesn’t make sense to bracket the truth of the normative beliefs that guide the 
transition itself. Reasoning well involves precisely taking some fact to be a reason of a 
certain strength when it actually is a reason of that strength, or at least something close 
enough.  
Note, however, that not all normative beliefs that are involved in reasoning govern 
transition from (what one takes to be) non-normative facts to a conclusion-state. Belief that 
one ought to do something, for example, doesn’t play a guiding role in this way. Instead, it 
functions relevantly like non-normative beliefs – as input to reasoning rather than as a part of 
our perspective on what favours what. Thus, for a non-vacuous account, it suffices that we 
don’t bracket the truth of those normative beliefs that guide the transition from premises to 
conclusion. This results in a view according to what makes reasoning good is that there is 
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sufficient reason for the conclusion, if the agent’s non-normative beliefs and normative 
beliefs that don’t guide the transition from non-normative beliefs to the conclusion are true. 
For short, we can say that in good reasoning there is sufficient reason for the conclusion, if 
the doxastic inputs of reasoning are true. Insofar as reasoning involves beliefs or belief-like 
attitudes like Pain on future Tuesdays doesn’t matter or That a car goes fast is a decisive 
reason for buying it, they are not inputs to reasoning, but attitudes that shape our response to 
how we take things to be. 
With this addition, Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons explains why enkratic 
reasoning in the Train Jump Case is good – were the doxastic input I ought to jump off the 
train true, the agent would have sufficient reason to intend to jump off the train. But unless 
controversial views about beliefs involved in intention are true, practical reasoning remains a 
mystery. To avoid these assumptions about the nature of intention, a reasons-responsiveness 
theorist might try a different tack. Maybe what makes reasoning good is that it’s sufficient-
reason preserving, in something like the way good deductive reasoning is truth-preserving. 
On this variant, the standard of good reasoning is that if one has sufficient reason for the 
premises, one will have sufficient reason for the conclusion, other things being equal. 
However, as McHugh and Way (forthcoming) point out, this won’t work, because one may 
have sufficient reason to believe something false. That means that when one falsely but with 
sufficient reason believes that there is gin in the glass, one won’t have sufficient reason to 
intend to drink from it, because the glass, after all, contains petrol. The move from the belief 
(and prior intention to drink gin) to the intention to drink from the glass is thus not 
sufficient-reason preserving. Nevertheless, it is intuitively good reasoning. 
 So what should a reasons-responsiveness view say about the role of intention in 
practical reasoning? Here’s something that seems true about the Uncle Case, for example: if 
you did have sufficient reason to intend the end, and if your non-normative beliefs were true, 
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you would have sufficient reason to take the means. More precisely, by Transmission, the 
fact that killing your uncle is necessary and sufficient to get his money would be a sufficient 
reason to kill him. Similarly in the Gin Case, if you did have sufficient reason to drink gin, 
and were your non-normative beliefs true, you would have sufficient reason to drink from 
the glass, derived from your reason to drink gin. What this suggests is that beliefs and 
intentions play very different roles in making reasoning good. For intentions, the model of 
preserving sufficient reasons works, because there is no analogue of a further dimension of 
assessment like truth in the case of belief. 
So perhaps the best form of a reasons-responsiveness account will be disjunctive, 
reflecting the different roles of doxastic and non-doxastic inputs: 
Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons*  
Reasoning from the contents of premise-states to conclusion C is good if and only if, 
and because, if the doxastic inputs are true and the agent has sufficient reason for 
non-doxastic inputs, the contents of belief-premises are sufficient reasons for C. 
 
On this picture, then, instrumental reasoning to believed necessary means, for example, is 
good roughly because were one to have a sufficient reason for the end-intention, it would 
guarantee that the contents of the means-beliefs (means M is necessary for end E, and up to 
me) would together sufficiently favour taking (and intending) the means. Conversely, 
reasoning is bad if there wouldn’t be a sufficient reason to have the conclusion-attitude even 
if the agent’s non-normative beliefs and non-guiding normative beliefs were true, and even if 
the agent had sufficient reason for her intentions. So someone who reasons from I will get 
rich and I will only get rich if I buy a lottery ticket now to I will buy a lottery ticket tomorrow 
reasons badly, because even if the inputs are correct, the content of the belief won’t provide 
a reason for the conclusion. 
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3 The Process of Reasoning 
Suppose I intend to steal my neighbour’s lawnmower, and believe that scaling the fence is 
necessary for me to do it, and that I won’t scale the fence without intending to do so (for 
short, that it’s up to me). Everyone agrees on two points: I may come to have the intention to 
scale the fence through some effortless, automatic process, or by way of reasoning. But what 
exactly do I do when I engage in reasoning? Rational requirements (or permissions) or 
perceptions of reasons evidently play some kind of role. But when we try to spell it out, we 
soon encounter a dilemma. The first horn I’ll call mere conformity. It could happen that I 
have, in succession, the following mental states: 
Intention to steal my neighbour’s lawnmower 
Belief that scaling the fence is necessary to steal my neighbour’s lawnmower and up 
to me 
Intention to scale the fence 
 
My psychological states, and their evolution over time, conform to diachronic rationality. 
But this isn’t yet a description of a process of reasoning: I have a permissible conclusion-
attitude, but for all that’s been said so far, I didn’t reason to it. I could have acquired the 
second intention as a result of a hit on the head. Further yet, bad reasoning is also possible. 
So mere conformity to a rational norm is neither sufficient nor necessary for reasoning. Nor 
will it suffice if the second intention is caused by the end-intention and the means-belief. It 
wouldn’t be a case of reasoning if the intention and belief caused me to intend to scale the 
fence by virtue of some bizarre association that might as well have resulted in an intention to 
eat a bowl of pasta.  For the process to be one of reasoning, the premise-attitudes have to 
cause the conclusion-attitude in virtue of my somehow taking them to rationally require 
conclusion-attitude or provide a reason for the conclusion. To avoid this horn, there is a 
temptation to conceive of the process as involving something like the following mental 
states: 
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Intention to steal my neighbour’s lawnmower 
Belief that scaling the fence is necessary to steal my neighbour’s lawnmower and up 
to me 
Belief that rationality requires (or permits) me to (intend to) scale the fence, given 
my intention and belief 
(Optional: Intention to conform to requirements of rationality) 
Intention to scale the fence 
 
The additional belief here is what Broome (2013) labels a normative higher-order belief, 
since it is a belief about normative relations among attitudes. He rightly raises two key 
objections to it. First, we can reason without such beliefs, which require a level of 
sophistication few of us have. Second, there’s good reason to think we are not even able to 
form beliefs, in particular, in response to such higher-order beliefs about rational 
requirements or permissions, even if combined with the optional intention to believe or 
intend in the required way. Beliefs aren’t susceptible to that type of voluntary control. Nor 
will adding a first-order belief about what follows from the contents of our attitudes do the 
job. That way lies Carroll’s famous regress – a rule that we use to derive a conclusion from 
premises cannot itself be among the premises, or we would need yet another rule to derive 
the conclusion from the new set of premises, and so on to infinity. 
What the dilemma shows is that in some way, the psychological transitions involved 
in reasoning must be guided by rational requirements or subjective reasons without their 
featuring in the contents of premises or as higher-order beliefs. Broome offers perhaps the 
most detailed account aiming to meet this constraint. For him, again, practical reasoning is 
an activity of bringing ourselves to conform to the requirements of rationality. To 
characterize this activity, it is insufficient to say that insofar as we are rational, we are 
disposed to move from premise-attitudes to the conclusion-attitude when rationality so 
requires (Smith 1994). This does not yet distinguish reasoning from automatic, non-actional 
conformity with rational requirements. Such a disposition might be regularly activated in a 
creature incapable of practical reasoning. The same goes for us: we often come to believe the 
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obvious consequences of our beliefs or (perhaps) intentions without engaging in reasoning, 
as a result of subpersonal processes. Psychological research suggests that this is true 
particularly of some simple forms of inference, such as modus ponens – even modus tollens 
requires more attention, and results in more errors (Evans 2006). 
 So there is a further question about how conscious reasoning works. Following 
Broome, let us begin with a simple case of theoretical reasoning. You are at an aquarium, 
where there are fish and sea creatures of all kinds. To your surprise, you see some dolphins 
repeatedly surfacing to breathe. So you form the belief (A) dolphins breathe air. It follows 
from your background zoology, based on vague memories of what you learned in school, 
that (B) if dolphins breathe, they are mammals. So you engage in a bit of quick reasoning 
that concludes with the belief that (C) dolphins are mammals (perhaps you had forgotten 
about this). What is that you do to get to C from A and B? Plausibly, one element in this is 
that you attend to the propositions, perhaps by engaging in a kind of inner speech, as 
Broome suggests. You say to yourself, whether silently or aloud, “Dolphins breathe” and “If 
dolphins breathe, they are mammals”, and then, as a causal consequence, “So, dolphins are 
mammals”. But what role does the relevant rule of inference play in this move? According to 
Broome, what makes the causal process reasoning is that the conclusion-belief is caused by 
consciously attending to the contents of the premise-attitudes and performing a rule-guided 
mental operation on them. It is performing this operation that licenses saying to yourself 
“So, …” on reaching the conclusion.  
But what is it to perform an operation on contents? For Broome, operating on 
contents is simply an activity of deriving a new content from them by way of applying a rule 
to them. When you are guided by a rule, he says, the derivation seems right to you, though at 
the same time you regard it as open to correction if checking results in its no longer seeming 
right (2013, 237–239). You’re following a rule correctly if the derivation has a steady 
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disposition of seeming right, Broome suggests. These remarks point to the deep waters of the 
rule-following debate. I will dip into them below, but this point, I will only register my 
disagreement with Broome’s claim that inferring in a way that conforms to modus ponens as 
a result of its robustly seeming right to do so entails believing a proposition of the form “If 
(p, and if p then q), then q” (229). Why should we think so? Many marks of belief that p 
have been proposed, such as willingness to avow p in suitable conditions and reliance on p 
as a premise in reasoning. Neither is true of Broomean linking propositions. So it is better 
not to assume that belief in them is necessary. 
 One problem that Broome himself observes with this picture is that insofar as the 
contents of thoughts are propositions, there is nothing to distinguish between reasoning from 
beliefs to beliefs and from intentions to intentions. Suppose you say to yourself “I will go to 
Paris in two weeks”. This could express either a belief about your future action or an 
intention to act. But the outcome of the mental operation of combining the content with the 
content of the belief that buying a ticket now is necessary for going to Paris is a different 
state depending on which kind of state the sentence expresses. To overcome this challenge, 
Broome introduces the idea that there is a marker in the content of the attitude that indicates 
whether it is the content of a belief or intention, for example (2013, 252). The content of a 
belief is a proposition together with a belief marker, while the content of an intention is a 
proposition together with an intention marker. So the content of a belief might be [I will go 
to Paris in two weeks; belief] and of the corresponding intention [I will go to Paris in two 
weeks; intention], where the markers are in fact inaudible. If we accept this, then it makes 
sense that contents with an intention marker are subject to different rule-governed operations 
than contents with a belief marker, and can yield different outputs. 
 Broome’s picture of reasoning is very liberal in one respect: for him, any rule-
governed mental operation on contents counts as reasoning. Correct reasoning, however, 
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operates with rational basing permissions. Take instrumental reasoning. According to 
Broome, the following is an instance of rationally permissible basing: 
 Instrumental Permission 
 N intends at some time to E, and 
N believes at some time that M is a means implied by E (one won’t E unless one 
does M) 
N believes at some time that doing M is up to her herself, and 
N intends at some time to M 
N’s intention to M is based on N’s intention to E, and belief that M is a means 
implied by E, and belief that M is up to herself. (Cf. Broome 2013, 257) 
 
Basing one’s intention to M this way is one way to come into conformity with WME. Such 
basing need not involve reasoning, as noted above. On Broome’s take, when it does involve 
reasoning, the operation is governed by the following rule (using square brackets to indicate 
psychological states): 
 From: 
 [E; intention] and 
 [M is a means implied by E; belief]  
 [M is up to me; belief] 
 to derive 
  [M; intention] (Cf. Broome 2013, 259) 
 
Now we have a full picture of Broome’s view. There are synchronic requirements of 
rationality that we ought to conform to, and corresponding (though not strictly speaking 
derived) diachronic basing permissions that tell us how we may come to do so. From basing 
permissions we derive rules that define which operations on contents amount to correct 
practical reasoning. 
 Broome’s work on reasoning is pioneering and in many ways enlightening. Yet there 
are a number of challenges to it that suffice to motivate developing a corresponding account 
based on the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception. I will here leave aside potential issues 
with introducing marked contents, which threaten to collapse the attitude/content distinction 
highlighted in Section 1. The first problem I’ll discuss has to do with the form of the rational 
basing permissions. On Broome’s conception, again, the rule you follow when reasoning 
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says that from the entire set of premises you may derive the conclusion – say, A, B, and C 
permit deriving D. Although this is appealing in the case of deductive reasoning, it is at least 
unlikely to suffice for practical reasoning (or indeed other types of theoretical reasoning). 
This is because practical reasoning, at least, is non-monotonic, as is widely acknowledged 
(Brandom 2000, Dancy 2004). What this means is that adding premises can turn a correct 
piece of reasoning into a bad one. It might be that A, B, C, and X do not permit deriving D, 
while A, B, C, X, and Y again do. Take the instrumental reasoning rule above. Once again, I 
intend to get my uncle’s money, believe that killing him is a means implied to get his money, 
and that killing him is up to me. Following Broome’s rule, I can reason well to the intention 
to kill him. But now add the belief that killing someone for money is never permissible. Now 
it seems I can only reason well to giving up the intention to get my uncle’s money. But 
Broome’s rule is either silent on what to do or still permits me to intend to kill (since I still 
have all the attitudes it features). To make sense of non-monotonic reasoning, we need to 
show how each individual premise contributes to establishing the conclusion. And there is 
no way basing permissions could capture this, since they apply to the entire set. We could, to 
be sure, imagine a potentially infinite list of basing permissions and corresponding rules 
governing every possible combination of contents, but then we wouldn’t be talking about a 
possible human activity any more. 
 The second problem concerns the picture of reasoning as a rule-governed operation 
on contents. It seems to me that what really does the work of distinguishing reasoning from 
mere causation of the conclusion-attitude by the premise-attitudes is the idea that we form 
the conclusion-attitude because it seems right to do so on the basis of the considerations we 
have consciously rehearsed, perhaps with the aim of finding out what they support. As Paul 
Boghossian puts it, using ‘inferring’ for the activity of belief reasoning, for S to infer from p 
to q “is for S to judge q because S takes the (presumed) truth of p to provide support for q.” 
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(Boghossian 2014) Broome himself says very little about what seeming right amounts to. It 
is not a phenomenal state, but just an “attitude of yours towards the mental process you go 
through when you reason”, which amounts to “a sort of personal endorsement from you” 
(2013, 238). I agree that an element of endorsement is necessary to distinguish reasoning 
from non-reasoning. But there is a gap between endorsing a transition from one content to 
another and performing a rule-guided mental operation, or so it seems. It is not clear to me 
why the latter would be necessary. It may of course be, and most likely is the case in 
something like modus ponens reasoning, that you are disposed to endorse any transition with 
the same formal features. But I see no reason to believe that endorsing a transition in a 
particular case requires this sort of generalizing commitment. If so, what distinguishes 
reasoning from non-reasoning may just be that you take the contents of the premises, taken 
together, to sufficiently favour the conclusion-belief or intention (if not action). And that 
brings us to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception. 
 So how might reasoning work on the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception? 
According to it, the point is not to come to conform to synchronic requirements of 
rationality, but to come to act and think in ways one has most objective reason to act and 
think, starting from one’s assumptions about how things are. In this process we work with 
subjective reasons, since from a first-person perspective they are indistinguishable from 
objective reasons. Bearing in mind that we can and typically do respond to reasons without 
engaging in the activity of reasoning (as Kate Manne emphasizes in her chapter), the process 
of conscious reasoning will begin with some triggering event: you’re puzzled or unsure 
about how to go on in thinking or acting. Consider the everyday cases I started this chapter 
with. In Advance, the triggering event is the realization that there’s money available that you 
haven’t budgeted for, so you need to decide what to do with it. In Paris, I believe, it is 
becoming aware that you have a goal that you don’t yet know how to reach – though this is 
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likely to be a controversial take on the situation. The awareness could coincide with forming 
the goal. 
 The triggering event is followed by a search for reasons. You rely on your automatic 
processes to bring to mind considerations that might bear on the problem. One way in which 
they can do so is by favouring a course of action. But as Dancy (2004) has rightly 
emphasized, favourers are not the only considerations bearing on what to do. There are also 
modifiers (attenuators, which weaken favourers, and intensifiers, which strengthen them) 
and conditions (enablers, which ‘turn on’ other facts as favourers, and disablers, which turn 
them off). You call these things to mind, among other things, by imagining what would 
happen if you did A or B, get a clearer idea of their force by calculating the odds of 
outcomes conditional on actions, and test your convictions by considering potential 
objections. The activity of reasoning thus involves many sub-actions in its service. 
I believe that in phenomenological terms, the most realistic view on the next 
operation, weighing reasons, is that it is performed alongside the search – each new 
consideration, as it were, moves the deliberative gauge in one direction or another, or 
perhaps silences other considerations. (For one detailed picture, see Cullity’s chapter in this 
volume.) In theory, it could be a separate stage. But the concurrent weighing model has a 
number of attractions. It fits nicely with the non-monotonicity of reasoning, as each 
individual consideration in turn may change the direction of the gauge. Now you lean 
towards A-ing, now towards B-ing. Where you end up when the music stops is your take on 
the balance of reasons. It is important that the process of seeking and weighing reasons has a 
diminishing marginal utility – you’ll soon be in a situation in which you’ll better conform to 
your objective reasons by engaging in some other activity than reasoning. (Consider how 
much time gets wasted when two or more philosophers try to decide which restaurant to go 
to.) To be reasons-responsive, you have to somehow register that you’ve run through enough 
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considerations. You might form the explicit belief that what you’ve rehearsed are all relevant 
facts, but that isn’t necessary. Let’s say there is a subjective termination point for reasoning. 
 I agreed with Broome and Boghossian that for the process to be reasoning, your 
conclusion-action or conclusion-attitude must be caused by your premise-attitudes in virtue 
of its seeming right to you to base your conclusion on them. You somehow treat the contents 
of the inputs to reasoning, taken together, as a reason for the act or the intention. As Dancy 
puts it, “when someone deliberates well and then acts accordingly, the action done is the one 
favoured by the considerations rehearsed in the deliberation, taken as a whole. It is a 
response to those considerations as together calling for or favouring it.” (2014, 4) But you 
don’t need to have the belief that they favour or call for the conclusion. So what is it to treat 
the premises as a reason? The Reasons-Responsiveness theorist will think it is the same sort 
of thing as treating anything as a reason. You have a positive attitude towards performing the 
act or forming the intention or belief, given the premises, and negative attitude towards not 
doing so. These attitudes are manifest in many different ways in how you play the game of 
giving and asking for reasons. When the fact that you move from accepting the premises to 
the practical conclusion is in part explained by your having such attitudes, you treat the 
former as a reason for the latter. 
 I will next work through the concrete cases I started with to make the case for the 
plausibility of this sketch. First, in Advance reasoning is triggered by the thought of as-yet 
unbudgeted windfall: what to do with it? The first option that comes to your mind is buying 
a new guitar. You may have seven already, but perhaps not an authentic Sienna Sunburst 
American Standard Stratocaster. That it would be nice to have one favours buying one. But 
then another thing occurs to you. Your family is growing and the old car is small, so you 
need a new car. This favours buying a car. Could you do both? You ruefully say to yourself 
“I can’t have both”. So you’re pulled in two different directions. Next, you make the 
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comparative judgment that the good at stake in buying the car is more important – as a 
decision theorist would put it, the expected utility of buying the car is greater than the 
expected utility of buying a guitar. The deliberative gauge now points towards buying a car, 
as you take it to be more strongly favoured than buying a guitar. You don’t see the need for 
further consideration. In response to taking the balance of reasons to favour buying a car, 
you form the intention to do so, expressing this to yourself by saying “So, I’ll buy a car.” By 
Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons*, this is good reasoning, because if things are as you 
assume, you do indeed have sufficient reason to (intend to) buy a car – you’re correct in 
taking the balance of reasons to favour buying it, and so respond to inputs to your reasoning 
as you should. 
Instrumental reasoning, such as Paris, is actually harder to make sense of on the 
Reason-Responsiveness Conception. The big question is: what is the major premise of such 
reasoning? In Section 1, we saw that it’s not that you intend to E. One possibility would be 
to follow Broome and make use of the notion of marked content. But it is not such contents 
that favour doing something, but rather potential states of affairs, as Dancy emphasizes. So I 
think the best way is to make what may seem like a radical move and drop the major premise 
altogether.18 My suggestion is that the intention plays a different, non-premise role. When 
you intend to E, you take the fact that M-ing facilitates E-ing as a reason to M, of a strength 
proportionate to the degree of facilitation. The intention will also motivate you to engage in 
reasoning in the first place.19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Interestingly, Aristotle’s examples of the practical syllogism also lack any premise corresponding to intention 
or desire. Anscombe, too, says that “the end ought to be specified, but the specification of the end is not in the 
same position as the premise” (1989, 378). Inspired by her, Alvarez says that “the premises of practical 
reasoning jointly show what good (or apparent good) there is in my doing something. But among those 
premises we won’t normally find the mere fact that I want to do something because that fact does not normally 
contribute to the good-making characteristics of the action” (Alvarez 2010, 362). 
19 Cf. Alvarez, who says that when we state the agent’s desire or intention in describing practical reasoning, 
”we state the point of the piece of practical reasoning – which is the goal for the sake of which the agent 
engages in practical reasoning and for the sake of which he acts, if he acts on that reasoning” (2010, 365). 
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Take the Paris case. It may be that the content of your intention is “I will be in Paris 
in two weeks”, as Broome claims. But on the view I’m sketching, it is not a premise in your 
practical reasoning. It is rather a part of the set-up. If you say it to yourself, you’re just 
getting yourself to focus on the topic you’ll be reasoning about. Then you say to yourself 
“Flying Ryanair is the cheapest way to get to Paris.” Given your intention, you take this fact 
(as you believe) to favour flying Ryanair, perhaps sufficiently. Alas, you next remind 
yourself that “Ryanair are greedy bastards who will rip you off if you close your eyes for a 
second.” This may either be a subjective reason not to fly Ryanair or an attenuator for the 
subjective reason you do have. Then you say to yourself “Flying Aer Lingus is the cheapest 
and most convenient of the remaining options”. This state of affairs, as you see it, favours 
flying Aer Lingus in the same way as the content of the first instrumental premise favoured 
Ryanair. Next, you weigh the reasons against each other, and say “So, I’ll fly Aer Lingus” to 
indicate your decision – formation of a more specific intention on the basis of the weighing 
operation that concluded with taking there to be sufficient reason for your conclusion-
response. Assuming that you don’t have evidence that considering more options would 
significantly improve the chances of doing what you have most objective reason to do, so 
that it’s rational to close off deliberation, you are now rationally required to intend to fly Aer 
Lingus, and a bit of additional instrumental reasoning takes you to the intention to book a 
flight now. (As is typical, you may need to engage in yet further instrumental reasoning to 
figure out the best way to book next.) 
Again, by Tracking Sufficient Would-Be Reasons*, you have reasoned well, since 
assuming you have sufficient reason to intend to travel to Paris, and that your non-normative 
beliefs about the various ways of getting there are correct, you do indeed have sufficient 
reason to (intend to) book a flight with Aer Lingus now. 
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4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented two competing contemporary views about the nature and 
correctness of practical reasoning. My discussion has taken place at a relatively high level of 
abstraction – I have said very little about what practical rationality or good reasoning 
requires. Indeed, on the Reasons-Responsiveness view there isn’t much that could be said 
about good reasoning in advance of substantive inquiry into objective reasons. According to 
the version I’ve tentatively sketched, what makes a thought process practical reasoning is 
that it is (fallibly) guided by what one takes to be reasons for action or intention, and what 
makes it good reasoning is that these reason-takings take one to an action or intention that 
one really does have sufficient reason for, if the doxastic inputs to reasoning are true and 
non-doxastic inputs permissible (in the sense of there being sufficient reason for them). 
Although I have pointed to some advantages of the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception 
over the Rule-Guidance Conception, the debate is very much open.  
I will end with a brief observation about the broader significance of this debate. Only 
the Rule-Guidance Conception grants normative significance to requirements of rationality 
as such. This means that any attempt to derive authoritative moral demands from practical 
reason must presuppose that some form of Rule-Guidance is correct. If, in contrast, the 
Reasons-Responsiveness Conception is correct, the authority and content of morality cannot 
derive from rationality. What makes reasoning correct derives from truths about reasons that 
are independent of rationality. The Reasons-Responsiveness Conception is thus bad news for 
Kantians and good news for Aristotelians and, arguably, Humeans. 
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